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I. INTRODUCTION
Whenever an agreement is signed by parties of two or more
countries, each with its own substantive laws, a contractual provision
identifying how disputes will be settled is essential. Without such a
provision, international business transactions lack predictability and
order when disputes between parties arise.1 Parties to an agreement
must decide if they want to settle disputes in the courts of a particular
jurisdiction or if they want to use a method of alternative dispute reso-
lution, such as arbitration. In addition, parties must determine what
law will be applicable in the case of a future dispute. Parties may
choose the law of a particular nation or they may make the contract
subject to the lex mercatoria, or international trade law.2
* J.D. candidate, 2010, University of Richmond School of Law.
' Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
2 MARK HULEATr-JAMES & NICHOLAs GOULD, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: A HANDBOOK 19 (LLP Reference Publishing 1996) (1999) (defining inter-
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If the parties choose arbitration as the process by which to set-
tle disputes, these details can be included within an arbitration clause
in the contract. International arbitration agreements are becoming
more common and are most often the preferred form of dispute settle-
ment between parties.3 Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute
resolution that allows parties to resolve disputes outside of court. If
parties choose to use the arbitration process, they agree by contract to
resolve disputes using a private adjudicator, the arbitrator.4 The arbi-
trator will make a binding and final decision, known as the "award."5
All parties that sign a contract containing an arbitration clause also
become parties to the arbitration clause.
A question attracting much attention in the international
arena is whether a non-signatory to a contract can be bound to the
arbitration agreement. This question raises fundamental concerns,
considering that one of the principal requirements of international ar-
bitration law is consent. This comment discusses some of the princi-
ples of international arbitration and its role in international
commercial transactions today. It focuses on the unsettled issue of
binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements and looks at theo-
ries used by courts to justify compelling parties to arbitrate. It also
discusses the implications of compelling parties to arbitrate, the im-
portance of upholding fundamental principles of arbitration to pro-
mote its effectiveness, and the role of the courts in the process.
II. BACKGROUND AND BASICS OF ARBITRATION
Although arbitration has become a more common method of
resolving differences between international actors, it is not a modern
method.6 Throughout history it has been used as a way to solve inter-
national disputes peacefully and judicially.' Countries have ceased to
allow national pride blind them from the effectiveness of arbitral pro-
ceedings. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States re-
jected its prior mindset that "all disputes must be solved under our
national trade law as "those principles governing the conduct of international
trade that which are generally accepted by international traders").
3 Id.
4 Robert M. Nelson, Guide - How to Bind Non-Signatories to an Arbitration
Clause; Guide - How to Prevent Non-Signatories from Being Bound by an Arbitra-
tion Clause 1, available at httpJ/www.nelsonadr.ca/media.php?mid=14&xwm=
true.
5 American Arbitration Association, Arbitration & Mediation (2007), http://www.
adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749.
6 ROBERT C. MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PROCEDURE 1-3 (Yale
Univ. Press 1911) (explaining how arbitration was used in Ancient Greece as a
police measure for the preservation of order).
7 Id. at 125.
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laws and in our courts."' Federal policy in the United States is now to"resolve any ambiguity as to the availability of arbitration in favor of
arbitration."9 When there is doubt concerning arbitrability, policy fa-
vors arbitration.' 0
Arbitration is the preferred alternative to litigation when com-
plex international contracts are involved." More and more agree-
ments include arbitration clauses as parties begin to realize that
international commerce today requires solutions outside of the realm
of national concepts.' 2 As Robert Briner, chairman of the Interna-
tional Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
said, "[i]nternational commercial arbitration is the servant of interna-
tional business and trade."' 3 The Supreme Court of the United States
acknowledged the importance of such agreements to resolve disputes
between parties of different states in an effective, orderly manner in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company.'4 The Court held that the arbitra-
tion agreement, which was part of a sale between an American com-
pany and a German citizen, should be respected and enforced.' 5 The
Court recognized that international commercial transactions were ris-
ing in number and a failure to recognize such international agree-
ments would deter individuals from entering in similar agreements in
the future.' 6
Some advantages of using arbitration with these contracts are
privacy, neutrality of the procedure, predictability, flexibility in proce-
8 JOACHIM G. FRICK, ARBITRATION AND COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 12
(Kluwer Law Int'l 2001).
9 Anthony DiLeo, The Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements by and Against
Nonsignatories, 2 J. AM. ARB. 31, 35 (2003).
10 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 992 F.2d 386 (1st Cir. 1993);
City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1983).
11 FRICK, supra note 8, at 7.
12 Id. at 11; see Michael P. Daly, Come One, Come All: The New and Developing
World of Nonsignatory Arbitration and Class Arbitration, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95,
96 (2007) (explaining that "[g]iven the increasingly global nature of business, it
has become normal to expect that many business disputes will involve corpora-
tions, investors... or any other interested parties who (1) are from different coun-
tries, and (2) have included a clause in their business agreements providing that
any potential contractual disputes will be resolved through international
arbitration.").
13 Robert Briner, Chairman, Int'l Court of Arbitration of the Int'l Chamber of
Commerce, Philosophy and Objectives of the Convention, Presented at the United
Nations "New York Convention Day" (June 10, 1998), in Enforcing Arbitration
Awards Under the New York Convention, at 9, available at http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf.
14 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 506-07 (1974).
'5 Id. at 506.
16 Id. at 517.
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dure, speed and cost, and the expertise of the arbitrators. 17 It also
allows for more flexibility and the preservation of relationships be-
tween those involved.' 8 Because national laws will have little impor-
tance in relation to these complex transactions that are entirely
international in nature, an agreement between parties must indicate
ahead of time which laws or principles will govern disputes.' 9
III. THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
The United States Federal Arbitration Act establishes that ar-
bitration agreements are valid as enforceable contracts.2 ° It says an
arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."2 1 The arbitration clause contained in a contract is
widely accepted as a separate agreement from the rest of the con-
tract.22 It has "autonomy" or "separability" from the other provisions
in the agreement.23 Therefore, even if a contract is terminated, the
arbitration agreement may remain valid. As the court in Peterson
Farms, Inc. v. C & M Farming Limited said, "[u]nder the doctrine of
separability, an arbitration agreement is separable and autonomous
from the underlying contract in which it appears."2 4
"The autonomy of arbitration agreements has become a univer-
sal principle in the realm of international commercial arbitration."2 5
A state may treat the arbitration clause as a separate contract and
apply international arbitration law rather than general contract law
when issues arise. One instance, however, when it may be difficult to
distinguish between the contract as a whole and the arbitration clause
contained within it, is when the existence of the contract is challenged.
If a court held the contract itself did not exist, then the arbitration
clause would likely be affected by that ruling.2 6
17 See FRICK, supra note 8, at 7; see also JAN PAULSSON, NIGEL RAWDING, Lucy
REED & ERIC SCHWARTZ, THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND ADR:
CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 3-5 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2d ed. 1999).18 Frick, supra note 8, at 7.
19 Frick, supra note 8, at 9.
20 Federal Arbitration Act of 1947, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
21 Id.
22 MARK HULEATT-JAMES & NICHOLAS GOULD, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: A HANDBOOK 16 (LLP Reference Publishing 2d ed. 1999) (1996).
23 Id.
24 Peterson Farms Inc. v. C&M Farming Ltd., (2004) L.R.Q.B 609 (Eng.) (quoting
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award finding).
25 Id. at 609.
26 See MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 225 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2d ed. 2001).
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IV. BINDING NON-SIGNATORIES TO ARBITRATION CLAUSES
A non-signatory to a contract may be bound to an arbitration
agreement under principles of contract law.2 ' Increasingly, parties to
a contract attempt to bind third party non-signatories to arbitration
agreements either because the third party was so involved in the per-
formance of the contract or the third party became involved in the dis-
pute.2' This attempt, understandably, is often met with resistance
from those third parties who do not want to be brought into the dis-
pute.29 This issue has raised considerable concern among courts and
scholars as well.30
Parties can only be bound to an arbitration clause if they in-
tended to be bound. 3' The Supreme Court said "arbitration is a matter
of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."32 The party must sign
the contract, or at least demonstrate a manifest intent to be a party to
the contract.33 While the facts in some cases support compelling a
non-signatory to be bound to a contract to avoid injustice, courts re-
main hesitant to make such a ruling because it goes against core rules
of arbitration and contract law.34
A. Theoretical Exceptions
Most courts still require either express or implied consent to
arbitration.35 When a case lacks an express agreement, courts will
look at the conduct of the party to consider whether that party demon-
strated implied consent.36 Under the doctrine of implied consent, sev-
eral exceptions to the signature requirement have emerged. These
27 See Interocean Shipping Co. v. Nat'l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527,
539 (2d Cir. 1975); Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 550 F.
Supp. 1079, 1086 (D. Me. 1982); Cia. Platamon de Navegacion, S.A. v. Empresa
Colombiana de Petroleos, 478 F. Supp. 66, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
28 Nelson, supra note 4, at 1.
29 Id.
30 See generally Daly, supra note 12, at 95.
31 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, §13:1 (2008).
32 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
33 See DOMKE, supra note 31, at § 13:1.
31 "The Courts have generally been cautious in compelling non-signatories to arbi-
trate due to the competing considerations of privity of contract and the autonomy
of the parties." PAULSSON, supra note 17, at 3.
35 BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT,
MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 50 (Dr. Julian D.M. Lew QC ed., Kluwer Law
Int'l) (2005).
36 Id. at 36-37. Usually only substantial involvement in the negotiation or per-
formance of the agreement will amount to consent.
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exceptions are: 1) incorporation by reference, 2) assumption, 3) agency,
4) veil piercing, and 5) equitable estoppel.3 1 While all of these excep-
tions warrant their own study and discussion, for the purpose of this
comment, a brief overview of each is provided.
1. Incorporation by Reference
Incorporation by reference applies when a party signs an
agreement that incorporates, or references, a second agreement which
includes an arbitration clause.3 ' Even though the party did not sign
the contract including the arbitration agreement, it will be compelled
to arbitrate because it signed the contract referencing the contract re-
quiring arbitration.39 The court in Upstate Shredding, LLC v. Carloss
Well Supply Co., turned this exception into a two-part test by requir-
ing that the agreement contain the words of incorporation and that the
arbitration agreement is broad enough to include the non-signatory.4 °
2. Assumption
A non-signatory may be bound under the theory of assumption
if he manifested intent to arbitrate through his conduct and another
party relied on that conduct. 41 The idea behind this theory is that the
non-signatory should not be allowed to express intent to arbitrate and
then later assert that an arbitral award is invalid.42 The non-signa-
tory will be considered to have "impliedly agreed to arbitrate."43 If the
non-signatory's conduct indicated that he waived any objection to be-
ing bound by the arbitration agreement then he would also be bound
under this theory.4 4
3. Agency
The agency exception is rooted in traditional laws of agency.
Agency is:
[T]he relationship that exists between two persons when
one, called the agent, is considered in law to represent
the other, called the principal, in such a way as to be able
37 Daly, supra note 12, at 99-102.
38 Id. at 99.
39 Nelson, supra note 4, at 29.
40 See Upstate Shredding, L.L.C. v. Carloss Well Supply Co., 84 F. Supp. 2d 357,
366 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Dwayne E. Williams, Binding Nonsignatories to Arbitration
Agreements, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 175, 176 (2006).
41 Daly, supra note 12, at 99.
42 Id.
43 Id.
" Williams, supra note 40, at 179.
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to affect the principal's legal position in respect of stran-
gers to the relationship by the making of contracts.4 5
A principal may be bound to an arbitration agreement signed by the
agent.4 6 However, there must have been an agency relationship and
when the contract was signed the agent must have been acting "within
the scope of the agency relationship."4" Problems arise when the prin-
cipal does not want to arbitrate and where there is no contract be-
tween the principal and agent.48
4. Veil Piercing
Veil piercing is a term well known in corporate law. It can bind
a non-signatory to an agreement if the agreement was signed by the
parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of a corporation. 49 Courts have justified
piercing the corporate veil in situations "to prevent fraud or other
wrong, or where a parent dominates and controls a subsidiary."5 ° It is
a very fact intensive analysis and courts tend to only apply this theory
in egregious circumstances.5 1
5. Equitable Estoppel
The equitable estoppel exception binds non-signatories who
take advantage of benefits in a contract but claim to be exempt from
the obligation of arbitration.5 2 It enables a non-signatory party bene-
fiting from a contract to be estopped from avoiding the obligations of
the contract.5 3 Tacie H. Yoon, an attorney for Wiley Rein, LLP wrote,"where a signatory to an arbitration agreement is asserting claims
against a non-signatory and seeks to compel arbitration, equitable es-
4'5 Nelson, supra note 4, at 18.
46 Daly, supra note 12, at 100.
47 Williams, supra note 40, at 177.
48 See Nelson, supra note 4, at 19 (Explaining that "[aibsent an explicit agency
agreement created by contract, a court may imply agency where the relationship
between a parent and subsidiary is such that the only business carried out by the
subsidiary is the parent's business.").
49 Daly, supra note 12, at 100-01.
50 Carte Blanche (Singapore) PTE., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 (2d
Cir. 1993).
51 Alexandra Ann Hui, Equitable Estoppel and the Compulsion of Arbitration, 60
VAND. L. REV. 711, 724 (2007).
52 Nelson, supra note 4, at 32.
53 William J. McSherry, Jr., Arbitrating By and Against Parties Who Have Not
Signed an Arbitration Agreement, METROPOLITAN CORP. CouNs., at 4 (2005) avail-
able at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=View&artMonth=
August&artYear=2005&EntryNo=3387.
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toppel rarely justifies binding the non-signatory to arbitrate those
claims."5 4
B. The Group of Companies Doctrine
The group of companies doctrine is another means by which
courts have recognized implied consent and bound non-signatories to
arbitration agreements. France was the first country to use this the-
ory and it has since been considered by courts around the world.5 5
This doctrine applies in cases where a party to an international trans-
action is a member of a group of companies. Consent of a non-signa-
tory member of the group may be implied if another member of the
group signed the agreement and the conduct of the group of companies
implied consent to the contractual obligations.5" Even if it is deter-
mined that a non-signatory belongs to a group of companies, a court
will still require the existence of consent or conduct amounting to
consent.57
Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain provides an example of
the group of companies doctrine.5" The question in Dow Chemical was
whether the arbitration clause in a contract was binding on companies
that did not sign the contract but were in the group and participated in
the formation, performance and termination of the contract. 59 The
case involved a parent company and its subsidiaries."0 To determine if
the non-signatory was bound to the arbitration clause in the contract,
the arbitrators considered the company's role in the performance of the
contract, the intention of the parties, and the company's concern of dis-
putes that may arise. 6 The arbitrators determined that the Dow
Chemical Company had absolute control over its subsidiaries and was
involved in the performance of the contract at issue. Therefore, the
arbitrators found that Dow Chemical was bound to the arbitration
clause, despite the fact it was not a signatory to the contract. 62 Sup-
porting the decision was the fact that even though each company had a
54 Tacie H. Yoon, Can a Non-Signatory to an Arbitration Agreement be Compelled
to Arbitrate? It Depends .., FRANCHISE ALERT (Jan. 18, 2008) available at http:/!
www.wileyrein.com/docs/newsletter-issues/551.pdf).
55 See HANOTIAU, supra note 35, at 96; Stephan Wilske, et. al., The "Group of Com-
panies Doctrine" - Where Is It Heading?, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 73, 74-75 (2006).
56 HANOTLAU, supra note 35, at 51.
57 Id. at 50.
58 Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain (Fr. U.S. Switz. v. Fr.), Int'l Comm. Arb.
131, 131-38 (1982) reprinted in 110 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet)
899, 899-907 (1983).
59 Id. at 131.
60 Id. at 132-33.
61 Id. at 136.
62 Id. at 136-37.
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distinct identity, they all shared the same economic reality. 63 The ar-
bitrators found that application of this doctrine conformed to the "mu-
tual intent of the parties."64 Thus, the arbitrators did not dismiss the
consent requirement, but rather acknowledged that it was a require-
ment for arbitration.6 5
Peterson Farms, Inc. v. C & M Farming Ltd. is an example of a
court refusing application of the group of companies theory.66 The
parties in Peterson entered into a contract for the sale of live poultry.67
The poultry was infected by a virus and C & M Farming initiated arbi-
tral proceedings as indicated by the sales contract.6" Not only did C &
M Farming receive damages in the arbitral award, but other C & M
group entities received damages pursuant to the group of companies
doctrine.69 The Tribunal said C & M entered into the contract as an
agent for the other members of the group and, therefore, those entities
were also parties to the arbitration clause. 70 On appeal, the court re-
jected the holding of the Tribunal and refused to recognize the group of
companies doctrine. 7 '
C. Debate Surrounding the Exceptions
These theoretical ways of binding non-signatories to arbitra-
tion agreements have caused much debate in the international arena.
Unfortunately, courts issuing opinions on this topic in many countries,
including the United States, are split and often issue conflicting hold-
ings. One of the reasons for this split is the unique fact patterns
presented by each case. Each case presents a different factual se-
quence that judges must consider and then compare against each ex-
ception to determine if the non-signatory should be bound to the
agreement. Some courts, in the interest of equity, are willing to bind
non-signatory parties to the contract. This is an exception to the prin-
ciples of contract and international arbitration law which generally
limit liability to parties who consent to enforceable promises.
63 Id. at 136.
64 Id. at 137.
65 Wilske, supra note 55, at 86-87
66 Peterson Farms, Inc. v. C & M Farming Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Comm) 121 (Eng.).
67 Id. at [2004] EWHC (Comm) 121 [3] (Eng.).
68 Id. at [2004] EWHC (Comm) 121 [61 (Eng.).
69 Id. at [2004] EWHC (Comm) 121 [61-[9] (Eng.).
70 Id. at [2004] EWHC (Comm) 121 [12] (Eng.).
71 Id. at [2004] EWHC (Comm) 121 [62]-[71] (Eng.).
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V. THREATENING FUNDAMENTALS
A. The Consent Requirement
An important requirement of international arbitration law is
the requirement of consent to arbitrate by all parties. To identify the
parties to an arbitration agreement, courts look at who consented to
the agreement. 72 Express consent is easily shown by a party's signa-
ture on a contractual document.7 3 Binding non-signatories to arbitra-
tion agreements goes against this foundational requirement of express
consent by forcing unwilling parties to arbitrate. As discussed above
courts justify binding non-signatories by using theories to show im-
plied consent. The problem is that court holdings have been inconsis-
tent and the importance of party consent has often been cast aside.7 4
The voluntariness of arbitration is a positive aspect of the pro-
cess and makes the process more effective in the international arena.
Because there is no uniform international law enforcing arbitration
clauses, the voluntary nature of the process encourages parties to com-
mit to arbitration and follow through with their obligations. Arbitra-
tion is a party's choice of dispute resolution. When a party to an
agreement is able to dictate the terms, it will be more likely to follow
those terms and abide by its decisions. It will take personal ownership
of the terms to which it agreed. A signatory to an agreement contain-
ing an arbitration clause knows what to expect when a dispute arises
and will not be forced into litigation. Instead, there will be a signed
contract clearly stating what law will apply and how the problem will
be resolved.
Another problem with binding non-signatories is that even if
that party was substantially involved in the negotiation or perform-
ance of a contract, it does not mean the party would have agreed to the
arbitration clause if it had been a signatory. Again, this raises the
question of lack of consent. In an International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) award, the arbitral tribunal refused to bind a party to the arbi-
tration clause explaining, "il n'est nullement etabli que si celle-ci avait
sign6 elle-mCme le contrat. . ., elle aurait accept6 la clause compromis-
soire" ("it is not at all certain that if the non-signatory had signed itself
the contract..., it would have accepted the arbitration clause").75
While a party may bind itself to the obligations of a contract, the arbi-
tration clause is a separate agreement that requires express consent.
72 HANOTIAU, supra note 35, at 8.
73 Id. at 32.
74 See Anthony DiLeo, The Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements by and
Against Nonsignatories, 2 J. AM. ARB. 31, 72 (2003) (explaining that courts should
not put policy goals favoring arbitration over consideration of whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate).
75 ICC award no. 2138 (1974) quoted in HANOTiAu, supra note 35, at 37 n.104.
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If a party did not sign an agreement containing an arbitration clause,
it likely did not agree to arbitrate in the event of a dispute.
There is also criticism of binding non-signatories based on the
argument that everyone should be given the right to a fair trial if they
so choose. Consequently, binding parties to an agreement that they
did not agree to is a fundamental problem because it denies them that
right. As noted earlier, according to arbitration principles, no one
should be forced to arbitrate. The New York Convention supports this
notion by requiring all arbitration agreements to be in writing. v6
B. The New York Convention
Article II of the New York Convention, an important treaty in
the realm of international arbitration, requires that the arbitration
treaty be in writing and signed by the parties.7" To date, there are 144
signatories to the Convention. s Kofi Annan, former Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations, referred to the Convention as "one of the
most successful treaties in the area of commercial law.""9 He said, "[i]t
has helped ensure fair treatment when disputes arise over contractual
rights and obligations. ... [W]ithout it parties are often reluctant to
enter into cross-border commercial transactions or make international
investments." s ° The Convention has served as a guide for interna-
tional commercial arbitration agreements and has provided more pre-
dictability in the law surrounding these agreements. An arbitral
tribunal in an ad hoc award noted:
76 United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, July 6,
1988, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
Art. II, 2, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-
conv/XXII_le.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL]; see Jean-Louis Delvolve, Third Par-
ties and the Arbitration Agreement, at 19 IT 3-7, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.2. (1988),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYC
Day-e.pdf.
77 UNCITRAL, supra note 76, at Art. II ("Each Contracting State shall recognize
an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitra-
tion all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship.. .concerning a matter capable of settlement
by arbitration.")
78 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status: 1958 - Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (2008),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitrationNYConvention-sta-
tus.html.
79 The Secretary-General, Opening Address Commemorating the Successful Con-
clusion of the 1958 United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbi-
tration, at 2, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.2 (1988) available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdffenglish/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf.
80 Id.
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Contrary to litigation in front of state courts where any
interested party can join or be adjoined to protect its in-
terests, in arbitration only those who are parties to the
arbitration agreement expressed in writing could appear
in the arbitral proceedings either as claimants or as
defendants. This basic rule, inherent to the essentially
voluntary nature of arbitration, is recognized inter-
nationally by virtue of Article II of the New York
Convention.8 1
Despite the fact that states are still sovereign entities and the New
York Convention lacks any international enforcement power, one of
the purposes of the Convention was to enforce arbitration awards be-
tween parties of different countries.8 2 Considering so many states
have signed and declared their willingness to incorporate the New
York Convention into their own national laws, the Convention has
proved effective.
While international organizations are gaining more power and
influence, national laws still prevail. The lack of universal enforce-
ment is not a fault of the New York Convention and international arbi-
tration, but rather a reflection of the state structure. UNCITRAL
published a Model Law in 1985, demonstrating its attempt to harmo-
nize national laws on the arbitration of international commercial dis-
putes.8 3 States are encouraged to incorporate all or part of this law
into their own national law in an effort to make arbitration law more
universal.
C. The Judicial Role in Arbitration
As arbitration requires consent of the parties involved, there is
no need for national laws to interfere with the process. If the parties
have contractually consented to resolve disputes in arbitration, they
are bound by that promise and cannot turn to courts to resolve the
issue. However, there are times when court assistance is useful to en-
81 HANOTIAU, supra note 35, at 7.
82 See Jan Paulsson, Vice President, London Court of International Arbitration,
Awards set Aside at the Place of Arbitration, at 24, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.2 (1988)
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/
NYCDay-e.pdf.
83 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration at 1-42., U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (1985) availa-
ble at http://www.uncitral.orgpdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671-
Ebook.pdf; see HULEATr-JAMES supra note 2, at 25.
BINDING NON-SIGNATORIES
sure the enforcement of the agreement and the arbitral award. 4 For
example, a court may be needed when the validity of the arbitration
agreement itself is disputed. Other examples of when a court may be
used are to assist in the appointment of an arbitrator, to remove an
arbitrator for bias or misconduct, to provide assistance to arbitrators,
and to establish whether an award is valid and final."5 When an arbi-
tration clause is challenged, the issue may go to the courts; however, if
the contract itself is in dispute, the issue is heard by an arbitrator.8 6
State courts must remember that party autonomy is one of the
most important principles in international arbitration. The autonomy
of the arbitration clause allows it to be treated separately from the rest
of the contract. Parties must not only have the freedom to choose if
they want to arbitrate, but also what laws will apply to the process and
how the process will work.87 Therefore, state courts should treat these
agreements as separate from any contract involving a national party
and only use the courts to enforce the arbitral award.
VI. CONCLUSION
International arbitration will continue to play an important
role in commercial transactions among parties of different states be-
cause it offers flexibility and predictability. Arbitration is an effective
way to resolve disputes outside national courts and preserve business
relationships. As the Court held in United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation, "[a]rbitration is the means of solving the unforesee-
able by molding a system of private law for all problems which may
arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally
accord with the variant needs and desires of the parties." 8
While arbitration is an effective means of dispute resolution, it
will only remain successful if arbitration clauses survive judicial deci-
sions and remain respected contractual agreements among consensual
parties. Especially in commercial transactions, parties expect liability
only when they breach an enforceable promise in a contract to which
84 ANDREAS BUCHER, Court Intervention in Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TowARDs "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 29,
29 (Richard Lillich & Charles Brower eds., 1994).
85 HULEATT-JAMES supra note 2, at 17.
86 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
87 Other decisions that need to be made include where the arbitration will take
place and how the arbitrator will be appointed. See HULEATT-JAMES, supra note 2,
at 16; Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 5 (Rich-
ard Lillich & Charles Brower eds., 1994).
88 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
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they were a party. This is a basic principle of contract law. Parties
should not expect to be held liable for obligations contained in con-
tracts to which they are not a party. One of the attractive aspects of
international commercial agreements is predictability. If they lose
this aspect, parties will be more hesitant to enter into these types of
agreements in the future.
Binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements has not only
brought national courts more into the arbitration process, it has ques-
tioned the principles of consent and severability which are at the core
of international arbitration law. Parties are compelled to join arbitral
proceedings without consenting, and arbitration clauses are being
used to bind those third parties. Through these decisions and cases,
courts and arbitrators have created a type of "common law of non-
signatories."89
With so many states now party to it, the New York Convention
was a positive addition to arbitration law, and has moved countries a
step closer to reaching international binding law on these issues. Al-
ternative dispute resolution as a whole is growing as a means of han-
dling international disputes, and arbitration leads this push. As
globalization continues and national markets are drawn closer and
closer together, this area of law will continue to move away from na-
tional laws and policies.
89 DiLeo, supra note 74, at 75.
